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Judgment-Proofing Voluntary Sector Organisations from Liability in Tort 
Phillip Morgan* 
Voluntary sector organisations (VSOs) may use ordinary principles of law to protect 
themselves from tort liabilities by rendering themselves judgment-proof. There are two viable 
judgment-proofing systems available to VSOs: (1) charitable purpose trusts, and (2) group 
structures. Whilst these systems are not fool-proof, they offer significant protection from tort 
liabilities. However, judgment-proofing may come at a high price to the voluntary sector. 
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I. Introduction 
Judgment-proofing is the careful structuring of organisations so as to render them men of 
straw for the purposes of litigation. Whilst typically found in a private sector context, 
judgment-proofing may also be used by voluntary sector organisations (³VSO´s). Such 
structures, whilst not fool-proof, provide significant protection to VSOs from tort litigation. 
However, judgment-proofing may come at significant cost to the voluntary sector.   
VSOs may use ordinary principles of law to protect themselves from tort liabilities by 
rendering themselves judgment-proof. This structuring provides for a form of organisational 
protection which achieves a similar function to an immunity or damages cap. The existing 
literature on judgment-proofing is concerned with for-profits and not the voluntary sector. 
This article is original in considering judgment-proofing from the perspective of the 
voluntary sector. Judgment-proofing has also not yet been considered from an English law 
perspective, and this article addresses this gap. 
 
Judgment-proofing may provide significant asset protection for VSOs, and discourage tort 
claims against VSOs. It allows a VSO to externalise its accident costs, resulting in them 
falling on victims or individual volunteers. Whilst some scholars have doubted that 
judgment-proofing is viable, this article demonstrates that it is used in some high-risk 
industries. This article demonstrates that there are two viable judgment-proofing systems 
available to VSOs: charitable purpose trusts and group structures. The latter uses 
incorporation and a symbiotic relationship between a risk generating entity and an asset 
holding entity designed to insulate the second from risk. There is a risk that both systems may 
be challenged by courts and legislatures, but doctrinally they should offer significant 
protection. 
Whilst judgment-proofing may provide significant protection to VSOs from tort liabilities, 
particular problems may arise with it in the voluntary sector context. Judgment-proofing may 
come at a cost for a VSO or the broader voluntary sector in terms of reputation, and reduced 
volunteering levels. A lower sector reputation may mean that it is more difficult for the sector 
to carry out many of its important roles. Judgment-proofing may also encourage greater state 
UHJXODWLRQXQGHUPLQLQJWKHVHFWRU¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH. Legislatures and courts may also 
intervene in some cases. VSO judgment-proofing, whilst possible, may come at a high price 
for the sector. 
Whilst this article focuses on the English common law, it makes reference to and draws upon 
material from other common law jurisdictions, and its conclusions apply throughout the 
common law world. 
II. The Voluntary Sector 
A. What is the Voluntary Sector? 
The International Labour Organization defines voluntary work as non-compulsory activities, 
³performed willingly and without pay to produce goods or services for others who are outside 
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WKHYROXQWHHU¶VIDPLO\RUKRXVHKROG´.1 Whilst volunteering may be formal or informal, an 
organisational requirement distinguishes the voluntary sector from individual acts of 
altruism.2   
 
*LYHQWKHVHFWRU¶VGLYHUVLW\, it is notoriously difficult to define its parameters.3 It includes 
charities, mutuals, co-RSHUDWLYHVDQGFRPPXQLW\RUJDQLVDWLRQV7KH8.¶V1DWLRQDO&RXQFLO
for Voluntary Organisations (³NCVO´) describes VSOs as organisations that consist of 
³people with shared values com[ing] together to achieve something independently of state 
and markets´.4 The sector is independent of the state and of the for-profit sector. Its purpose 
is not to make and distribute profits to its owners, and it does not derive its power from the 
state or exercise public functions.5 VSOs may have paid workers and/or managers, but to be a 
VSO, an organisation needs to significantly rely on volunteers as part of its workforce and/or 
leadership.6 There is some sector overlap. For instance, VSOs may enter into contractual 
relationships with the state to deliver services and some mutuals distribute profits to 
members.7  
 
The voluntary sector is diverse in the size, aims, motivations, and activities carried out by 
962V:KLOVWWKHVHFWRU¶VLQFRPHLVGRPLQDWHGE\ODUJHFKDULWLHV,8 it extends significantly 
beyond charities. Not all VSOs exclusively pursue charitable purposes, or have sufficient 
public benefit to be charitable. Some may also pursue political purposes.   
At one extreme, the sector includes large, well-funded, formally-structured entities with 
international footprints managed by paid employees. Where volunteers are recruited for 
specific roles, they are trained and directed. This is termed DµYHUWLFDO¶IRUPRIYROXQWHHULQJ
At the other extreme are informal, unfunded, unincorporated associations, led by volunteers. 
All of their activities are undertaken by volunteers. This is termed DµKRUL]RQWDO¶IRUPRI
volunteering.9 The combination of the different functions of the sector, varied forms of 
volunteering, and motives for volunteering make the sector an intrinsically complex social 
phenomenon.10 
 
 
                                                          
1International Labour Organization, ³Volunteer Work´(28 April 2016), online: International Labour 
Organization <www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/statistics-overview-and-topics/WCMS_470308/lang-
-en/index.htm>. 
2Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of Organised Civil Society (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) at 37. 
3Brian Dollery & Joe Wallis, The Political Economy of the Voluntary Sector (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2003) at 2-4; $OLVRQ'XQQ³,QWURGXFWLRQ´LQ$OLVRQ'XQQHGThe Voluntary Sector, the State, and 
the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) at 1; Garton, supra note 2 at 23. 
4³Independence and Values´ (10 June 2012), online: The National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
<www.ncvo.org.uk/policy-and-research/independence-values>.  
5Richard Best, ³Foreword´ in Alison Dunn, ed, The Voluntary Sector, the State, and the Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2000) at vi; Garton, supra note 2 at 21-22, 36. 
6Jeremy Kendall & Martin Knapp, The Voluntary Sector in the United Kingdom (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1996) at 18. 
7Garton, supra note 2 at 21, 39; cf. Kendall & Knapp, supra note 6 at 18 (excluding such organisations). 
8&ODLUH%pQDUGHWDO³7KH Civil Society Almanac 2018 6XPPDU\´ (2018) at 10, online (pdf): 
<data.ncvo.org.uk/documents/11/ncvo-uk-civil-society-almanac-2018.pdf>. 
9Colin Rochester et al, Volunteering and Society in the 21st Century (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK, 2010) at 10-13. 
10Lesley Hustinx, Ram Cnaan & Femida Handy, ³Navigating Theories of Volunteering: A Hybrid Map for a 
Complex Phenomenon´ (2010) 40:4 Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 410. 
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B. Role of the Sector 
The voluntary sector has a long history in the common law world.11 The sector carries out 
functions that other sectors do not.12 However, the sector does more than simply fill gaps left 
by other sectors. It also plays an important democratic function, allowing people to find 
solutions to social problems without needing to rely on the state. It can advocate minority 
interests, including those of disadvantaged groups,13 and empower disadvantaged 
communities through mutual self-help, providing self-determination, and services delivered 
ZLWKDJUHDWHUOHYHORIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ7KHVHFWRU¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHIURPJRYHUQPHQWDOVR
means that communities can avoid the stigma associated with receiving government 
services.14 Community proximity means that the sector can have greater efficiency and 
expertise than the state, permitting a more targeted provision of services.15 
 
The sector helps to strengthen community ties, enhance social cohesion, and broaden 
community support networks. It is also an important conduit for altruism. VSOs can 
contribute towards government accountability and promote citizen involvement in society.16  
VSOs can help shape policy and can speak on behalf of their volunteers and beneficiaries, 
providing a voice to grassroots concerns.17 They are often trailblazers, in many cases with the 
state subsequently following.18   
C. Scale of the Sector 
The scale of the voluntary sector reinforces the importance of considering the viability of 
judgment-proofing within the sector. The UK has one VSO per 400 people.19 In 2017-18, it 
was estimated that 11.9 million people formally volunteered on a regular basis whilst 20.1 
million people formally volunteered at least once.20 The UK has more full time equivalent 
volunteers than there are paid employees in the construction sector.21 The Office of National 
Statistics has estimated that regular volunteering (once a month or more) is worth GBP £23.9 
billion per year to the UK (1.5% of WKHFRXQWU\¶VGDP).22 The European Commission 
                                                          
11See e.g. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by Harvey Mansfield & Delba Winthrop 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) at 489-92. 
12%XUWRQ:HLVEURG³7RZDUGD7KHRU\RIWKH9ROXQWDU\Nonprofit Sector in a Three-6HFWRU(FRQRP\´LQ6XVDQ
Rose-Ackerman, ed, The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 22-32; 
cf. Lester Salamon & Helmut Anheier, ³6RFLDOOrigins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross-
Nationally´ (1998) 9:3 Voluntas 213; Garton, supra note 2 at 54. 
13Alison Dunn, ³Political Activity and the Independence of the Voluntary Sector in Alison Dunn, ed, The 
Voluntary Sector, the State, and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) at 145 >'XQQ³3ROLWLFDO$FWLYLW\´@. 
14-DPHV'RXJODV³3ROLWLFDO7KHRULHVRI1RQSURILW2UJDQL]DWLRQ´LQ:DOWHU3RZHOOHGThe Nonprofit Sector: A 
Research Handbook, 1d (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) at 50. 
15Garton, supra note 2 at 57-59. 
16Ibid at 71-73; 1&92³&RPPLVVLRQRQWKH)XWXUHRIWKH9ROXQWDU\6HFWRU0HHWLQJWKH&KDOOHQJHRI&KDQJH
Voluntary Action into the 21st &HQWXU\´1&92DW-4.  
17'XQQ³3ROLWLFDO$FWLYLW\´supra note 13 at 143-45. 
18Douglas, supra note 14 at 48. 
19'DYLG.DQHHWDO³7KHUK Civil Society Almanac 2015 +LJKOLJKWV´ (2015) at 12, online (pdf): The National 
Council of Volunteer Organisations <data.ncvo.org.uk/documents/8/ncvo-uk-civil-society-almanac-2015.pdf> 
(no equivalent calculation in 2018 or 2019 Almanac). 
201&92³UK Civil Society Almanac 2019, Volunteering Overview´ (2019), online: The National Council of 
Volunteer Organisations <https://data.ncvo.org.uk/volunteering/ >. 
21Andrew Haldane, ³In Giving, How Much do we Receive? The Social Value of Volunteering´ (Lecture 
delivered at the Society of Business Economists, London, 9 September 2014) at 5, online (pdf): Bank for 
International Settlements <bis.org/review/r141028c.pdf>. 
22UK, Office for National Statistics, Household Satellite Accounts ² Valuing Voluntary Activity in the UK by 
Rosemary Foster (London: Office for National Statistics, 2013) at 1. 
5 
 
HVWLPDWHVWKDWWKH8.¶VYROXQWHHUFRQWULEXWLRQWR GDP is between 2-3%.23 Large voluntary 
sectors are also found throughout the common law world. For instance, in 2013, it was 
estimated that 44% of Canadians volunteered for charitable or non-profit organisations, 
contributing 1.96 billion hours.24 The value of volunteer services in Canada has been 
estimated at 2.6% of WKHFRXQWU\¶V GDP.25 In 2014, 31% of Australians volunteered through 
organisations or groups, contributing 743 million hours.26 In the US, in 2018, 30.3% of 
Americans volunteered through an organisation, a total of 77.3 million volunteers, providing 
an estimated USD $167 billion in services.27 
D. VSO Organisational Form 
As we have seen above, an organisational requirement distinguishes the voluntary sector 
from acts of individual altruism. The legal forms available to the organisation depend on 
ZKHWKHUD962¶VREMHFWVDUHFKDULWDEOH$Qincorporated VSO may take the form of a 
company limited by guarantee, a company limited by shares, a charitable incorporated 
organisation, an industrial and provident society, a friendly society, a community interest 
company, or a corporation. An unincorporated VSO may take the form of a trust or an 
unincorporated association.28 The form adopted by a VSO may change over time. Many 
organisations start as unincorporated associations and later incorporate as their activities and 
potential liabilities expand.29 The VSO may also consist of one or more entities and a mix of 
legal forms.   
III. Tort Law and the Voluntary Sector 
The voluntary sector delivers significant services and is a key plank in government policy 
across the common law world. It is therefore odd that the sector has attracted little attention 
from Commonwealth legal scholars30 and no attention from English tort scholars.31 Some 
limited attention has been paid in relation to torts and the voluntary sector in the US, Canada, 
Ireland, and Australia.32 The purpose of this section is not to reinforce compensation culture 
                                                          
23UK, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, Volunteering in the European Union (Brussels: 
GHK, 2010) at 11. 
24Martin Turcott, Volunteering and Charitable Giving in Canada (Ontario: Statistics Canada, 2015) at 3. 
25The Conference Board of Canada, ³7KH9DOXHRI9ROXQWHHULQJLQ&DQDGD´DWRQOLQHSGI 
<volunteer.ca/vdemo/Campaigns_DOCS/Value%20of%20Volunteering%20in%20Canada%20Conf%20Board
%20Final%20Report%20EN.pdf>. 
26$XVWUDOLDQ%XUHDXRI6WDWLVWLFV0HGLD5HOHDVH³General Social Survey: Summary Results, Australia, 
2014´-XQH, online: Australian Bureau of Statistics <www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4159.0>. 
27&RUSRUDWLRQIRU1DWLRQDODQG&RPPXQLW\6HUYLFH³Volunteering in US Hits Record High´1RYHPEHU
2018), online: Corporation for National and Community Service <www.nationalservice.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2018/volunteering-us-hits-record-high-worth-167-billion>. 
28Con Alexander et al, Charity Governance, 2d (Bristol, UK: Jordan Publishing, 2014) at 17-8. 
29William Henderson, Jonathan Fowles & Julian Smith, eds, Tudor on Charities,10d (London, UK: Thomson 
Reuters UK, 2015) at 330-31.  
30Notable exceptions include the work of Debra Morris and Jonathan Garton; the fact that tort may play a role in 
regulating the externalities of the voluntary sector is alluded to by Garton, supra note 2 at 100. 
316DYHWKHDXWKRU¶VRZQZRUNVHHe.g. Phillip Morgan, ³Recasting Vicarious Liability´ (2012) 71:3 Cambridge 
Law Journal 615; see also Phillip Morgan, ³Vicarious Liability and the Beautiful Game ² Liability for 
Professional and Amateur Footballers?´ (2018) 38 Legal Studies 242. 
32See e.g. Jeffrey Kahn, ³2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶/LDELOLW\IRUWKH7RUWVRI9ROXQWHHUV´ (1985) 133:6 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1433; Kenneth Biedzynski, ³The Federal Volunteer Protection Act: Does Congress 
Want to Play Ball?´ (1998-1999) 23:2 Seton Hall Legislative Journal 319; Brenda Kimery, ³Tort Liability of 
Nonprofit Corporations and their Volunteers, Directors, and Officers: Focus on Oklahoma´ (1997-1998) 33 
Tulsa Law Journal 683; Daniel Barfield, ³Better to Give than to Receive: Should Nonprofit Corporations and 
Charities Pay Punitive Damages?´ (1994-1995) 29 Valparaiso University Law Review 1193;  
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concerns, but rather to briefly illustrate that tort does play a role within the voluntary sector, 
and it is not imprudent for VSOs to consider the management of liability risks. 
 
The activities of VSOs may create tort litigation risks. Although within the UK official data 
as to the number of voluntary sector tort claims is not available,33 it is possible to identify 
English tort cases where VSOs are the defendants. These cases include those where the VSO 
is alleged to be in breach of a direct duty to the victim or that the VSO is vicariously liable 
for the torts of its volunteers or employees.34 The actions against VSOs include claims as 
diverse as direct claims in negligence,35 RFFXSLHU¶VOLDELOLW\36 and vicarious liability for a 
YROXQWHHU¶VQHJOLJHQFH37 or for sexual abuse torts.38 Similar cases may also be identified 
throughout the common law world. Within the US, it is possible to identify a large number of 
tort cases in which VSOs are sued. The causes of action are broad and include nuisance, 
FRQYHUVLRQQHJOLJHQFHRFFXSLHU¶VOLDELOLW\GHIDPDWLRQDQGYLFDULRXVOLDELOLW\IRUERWK
negligence and intentional torts.39 VSOs have also been defendants to tort actions in 
Australia40 and Canada.41 With sexual abuse torts, VSOs throughout the common law world, 
SDUWLFXODUO\FKXUFKHVDQGWKRVHLQYROYHGLQFKLOGUHQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVRUUHVLGHQWLDOFDUHKDYHIDFHG
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Andrew Popper, ³A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnerable´ (1998) 35 Harvard Journal on 
Legislation 123; Margaret H Ogilvie, ³Vicarious Liability and Charitable Immunity in Canadian Sexual Torts 
Law´ (2004) 4:2 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 167; Myles McGregor-Lowndes & Linh 
Nguyen, ³Volunteers and the New Tort Reform´ (2005) 13:1 Torts Law Journal 41; Law Reform Commission, 
Civil Liability of Good Samaritans and Volunteers (Dublin: LRC 93-2009). 
330LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFH³6RFLDO$FWLRQ5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQG+HURLVP%LOO,PSDFW$VVHVVPHQW´DWpara 9, 
online (pdf): UK Ministry of Justice 
<assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/319479/sarah-bill-
impact-assessment.pdf>.  
34See e.g. Vowles v Evans, [2003] EWCA Civ 318; Scout Association v Barnes, [2010] EWCA Civ 1476 
[Barnes]; Cattley v St John Ambulance Brigade (25 November 1988), 87 NJ 1140/1986 c 133 (QBD (Eng)) 
[Cattley]; Petrou v Bertoncello, [2012] EWHC 2286 (QB); Jones v Northampton BC, Times, 21 May 1990 (CA 
(Eng)); Prole v Allen, [1950] 1 All ER 476 (Assizes (Somerset)); Horne v RAC Motor Sports Association 
Limited, 1989 WL 649997 (CA (Eng)); Bowen v National Trust, [2011] EWHC 1992 (QB); Driver v Painted 
House Trust, [2014] EWHC 1929 (QB) [Driver]; Bottomley v Todmorden Cricket Club, [2003] EWCA Civ 
1575 [Bottomley]; Murphy v Zoological Society of London, Times, 14 November 1962 (QB); Cole v Davis-
Gilbert, [2007] EWCA Civ 396; Craddock v Farrer, and the Scout Association, (Preston CC, 17 Nov 2000); 
Morrison v The Scout Association, (Newtownards CC, 6 Nov 2002); A v The Trustees of the Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society, [2015] EWHC 1722 (QB) [Watchtower Bible]. 
35Bottomley, ibid. 
36Driver, supra note 34. 
37Barnes, supra note 34; Cattley, supra note 34. 
38Watchtower Bible, supra note 34. 
39The cases are too numerous to list; a small number of examples include: Avenoso v Mangan, 40 Conn L Rptr 
637 (Conn Super Ct 2006); Sweeney v Friends of Hammonasset, 140 Conn App 40 (Conn App Ct 2013); Entler 
v Koch, 85 AD (3d) 1098 (NY App Div 2011); Ayala v Birecki, 17 Mass L Rptr 175 (Mass Super Ct 2003); 
Gaudet v Braca, 33 Conn L Rptr 200 (Conn Super Ct 2002); Lomando v US, 2011 WL 1042900 (NJ Dist Crt 
2011); Waschle ex rel Birkhold-Waschle v Winter Sports, Inc, 127 F Supp (3d) 1090 (Mont Dist Crt 2015); 
Meyer v Beta Tau House Corporation, 31 NE (3d) 501 (Ind Ct App 2015); Dogs Deserve Better, Inc v New 
Mexico Dogs Deserve Better, Inc, 2016 WL 6396392 (N Mex Dist Crt 2016); American Produce, LLC v 
Harvest Sharing, Inc, 2013 WL 1164403 (Colo Dist Crt 2013); +DUULVY<RXQJ:RPHQ¶V&KULVWLDQ$VVRFLDWLRQ
of Terre Haute, 250 Ind 491 (Ind Super Ct 1968); 0F$WHHY6W3DXO¶V0LVVLRQRI0DU\VYLOOH, 190 Kan 518 (Kan 
Super Ct 1962). 
40See e.g. Echin v Southern Tablelands Gliding Club, [2013] NSWSC 516 (Austl); Goodhue v Volunteer Marine 
Rescue Association Incorporated, [2015] QDC 29 (Austl); Kennedy v Pender & Narooma Rugby League FC (8 
February 2001) NSWDC (Austl). 
41See e.g. Grimmer v Carleton Road Industries Association, 2009 NSSC 169. See also the notorious Re 
Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada (2000), 47 OR (3d) 674 (ONCA) [Christian Brothers]. 
7 
 
high-profile sexual abuse litigation for the acts of their employees, ministers, or volunteers.42 
It is not unknown for such litigation to result in attempts to wind up the defendant VSO and 
seize its assets to pay claimants.43 
 
VSO tort litigation risks may also be enhanced where they contract with the state to replace 
formerly state-delivered functions44 or where they respond to new social challenges.45 
However, it is difficult to judge the significance of tort within the voluntary sector. This is not 
the place to discuss the voluminous literature on whether or not England is in the grip of a 
compensation culture.46 Similar debates are also found in other common law jurisdictions for 
example Australia and Ireland.47 
 
Such debates will not be solved by examining statistics of claim rates since culture does not 
just affect the propensity to sue but also affects the way in which the spectre of liability 
FKDQJHVSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXU,QH[DPLQLQJWKHLQWHUIDFHEHWZHHQWRUWDQGWKHYROXQWDU\VHFWRU, 
we also must be more specific and concern ourselves only with the voluntary sector. For 
instance, a claims culture in road traffic accidents is not necessarily representative of the 
YROXQWDU\VHFWRU¶VH[SHULHQFH 
 
Whilst the reported English cases identified above may not be representative of VSO tort 
litigation, there is evidence of voluntary sector concerns in relation to tort litigation. The 
                                                          
42See e.g. Jacobi v Griffiths, [1999] 2 SCR 570; John Doe v Bennett, 2004 SCC 17 [Doe]; JGE v Portsmouth 
Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust, [2012] EWCA Civ 938 [JGE]; Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare 
Society, [2012] UKSC 56 [Various Claimants]; Austl, Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional 
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Final Report Recommendations (Royal Commission 2017), online (pdf): < 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/final_report_-_recommendations.pdf>; 
Paula Giliker, ³Analysing Institutional Liability for Child Sexual Abuse in England and Wales and Australia: 
Vicarious Liability, Non-'HOHJDEOH'XWLHVDQG6WDWXWRU\,QWHUYHQWLRQ´:3 Cambridge Law Journal 506; 
Manter v Abdelhad, 32 Mass L Rptr 709 (Mass Super Ct 2014); Timothy Lytton, Holding Bishops Accountable 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
43See e.g. Christian Brothers, supra note 41. For an American account see Lytton, ibid. 
44Debra Morris, ³Charities and the Big Society: A Doomed Coalition?´ (2012) 32:1 Legal Studies 132 at 138; 
see also UK, Charity Commission for England and Wales, Charities and Public Service Delivery: An 
Introduction and Overview (CC37) (Charity Commission, 2012). 
45John Plummer, ³Premium Issue for the Sector´ Third Sector (21 February 2011), online: 
<www.thirdsector.co.uk/premium-issue-sector/finance/article/1055677>.  
46See Richard Lewis & $QQHWWH0RUULV³Challenging Views of Tort: Part II´ (2013) Journal of Personal Injury 
Law 137; Richard Lewis & Annette Morris, ³Tort Law Culture: Image and Reality´ (2012) 39:4 Journal of 
Legal Studies 562; UK, HM Government, Common Sense Common Safety (Report) by Lord Young (London: 
Cabinet Office, 2010) [Lord Young, Common Sense]; 5LFKDUG/HZLV³&RPSHQVDWLRQ&XOWXUH5HYLHZHG
,QFHQWLYHVWR&ODLPDQG'DPDJHV/HYHOV´-RXUQDORI3HUVRQDO,QMXU\/DZ Annette Morris, 
³µ&RPPRQ6HQVH&RPPRQ6DIHW\¶WKH&RPSHQVDWLRQ&XOWXUH3HUVSHFWLYH´-RXUQDORI3URIHVVLRQDO
Negligence 82; James Goudkamp, ³The Young Report: An Australian Perspective on the Latest Response to 
%ULWDLQ¶VµCompensation Culture¶´ (2012) 28 Journal of Professional Negligence 4; Richard Lewis, Annette 
Morris & Ken Oliphant, ³Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics: Is there a Compensation Culture in the United 
Kingdom?´ (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 158; Annette Morris, ³The µCompensation Culture¶ and the Politics of 
Tort´LQTT Arvind & Jenny Steele, eds, Tort Law and the Legislature (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) at 57-79; 
Annette Morris, ³Spiralling or Stabilising? The Compensation Culture and Our Propensity to Claim Damages 
for Personal Injury´ (2007) 70:3 Modern Law Review 349; Kevin Williams, ³State of Fear%ULWDLQ¶V
µCompensation Culture¶ Reviewed´ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 499. 
47'DYLG,SS³7KH3ROLWLFV3XUSRVHDQG5HIRUPRIWKH/DZRI1HJOLJHQFH´$XVWUDOLDQ/DZ-RXUQDO
456; David Ipp, ³Policy and the Swing of the Negligence Pendulum´ (2003) 77 Australian Law Journal 732; 
Austl, Commonwealth, Law of Negligence Review Panel, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report by 
David Ipp (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002); Law Reform Commission, Civil Liability of Good 
Samaritans and Volunteers (Dublin: LRC 93-2009). 
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sector is increasingly aware of  risks.48 Within the UK, some VSOs have expressed concerns 
DERXWWRUW¶VLPSDFWRQWKHLURSHUDWLRQV49 and fears as to  risks or liabilities.50 There is 
UHIHUHQFHWRYROXQWDU\VHFWRUWRUWIHDUVLQERWK/RUG<RXQJ¶VUHSRUW51 DQG/RUG+RGJVRQ¶V
report.52 However, whilst both reports widely consulted within the voluntary sector, and Lord 
Hodgson was the then President of the NCVO and his report task force included leading 
figures from the sector, the findings of both reports on this issue are given without any 
evidential support. However, one UK survey notes that 5% of the surveyed VSOs have had 
insurance or legal claims against volunteers or trustees.53   
 
There is also evidence that the voluntary sector responds WRWRUWOLWLJDWLRQULVNV6FKZDUW]¶V
study revealed that the removal of, or reduction in, charitable immunity from torts in the US, 
combined with increasing insurance rates, led to behavioural changes in the voluntary and 
non-profit sector.54 Surveys within the US have also demonstrated that potential liability 
reduces charitable activity and that liability risks can influence the provision and delivery of 
non-profit organisations services.55 Further, there is evidence that charitable hospitals have 
increased their charges in response to the removal of charitable immunity.56 There is also 
some evidence from Ireland that liability and insurance issues have caused some volunteer 
services to close.57 (PSLULFDOUHVHDUFKFRQGXFWHGRQEHKDOIRIWKH8.¶V&DELQHW2IILFe shows 
that the risk of liability  impacts on volunteering levels .58 Similar evidence has also been 
                                                          
48Katherine Gaskin, On the Safe Side Risk, Risk Management and Volunteering (England: Volunteering England 
DQG7KH,QVWLWXWHIRU9ROXQWHHULQJ5HVHDUFK$OH[%O\WK³Risk Management: 2FFXSDWLRQDO+D]DUGV´
Third Sector (27 July 2005); *UDFLD0F*UDWK2SLQLRQ³$UH/HJDO&RQFHUQV$IIHFWLQJ9ROXQWHHU1XPEHUV"´
Third Sector (17 August 2005), online: <www.thirdsector.co.uk/opinion-hot-issue-legal-concerns-affecting-
volunteer-numbers/article/620049>. 
49See generally UK House of Commons debates on the Promotion of Volunteering Bill (Bill 18 of 2003-04), e.g. 
HC Deb (5 March 2004) cols 1149-1200. 
50³We continue to get a lot of calls from charities and individual volunteers about risk and liability. The chances 
of any action being taken against them are very low but there is clearly a great concern about risk´ per Justin D 
Smith, NCVO Executive Director for Volunteering and Development, quoted in UK, House of Commons 
Library, Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill (Research Paper 14/38, 2014) at 26; see also Sport 
(QJODQG³6SRUWV9ROXQWHHULQJLQ(QJODQGLQ´-XO\DW71-2, 146-147, online (pdf): 
<sportengland.org/media/3617/valuing-volunteering-in-sport-in-england-final-report.pdf>. 
51Lord Young, Common Sense, supra note 46 at 23. 
52UK, Red Tape Task Force, Unshackling Good Neighbours (London: Cabinet Office, 2011) at 8 (Chair: Lord 
Hodgson), online (pdf): 
<assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62643/unshackling-
good-neighbours.pdf>. 
53Gaskin, supra note 48 at 4, 12. 
54Gary Schwartz, ³Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?´ (1994) 42 
UCLA Law Review 377 at 413. 
55Charles Tremper, ³Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity´ (1991) 76 Cornell Law Review 401 at 
417-18. 
56Bradley Canon & Dean Jaros, ³The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The Abrogation of Charitable 
Immunity´ (1979) 13 Law & Society Review 969; cf. Gregory Caldeira, ³Changing the Common Law: Effects 
of the Decline of Charitable ,PPXQLW\´-82) 16:4 Law & Society Review 669. 
57I, Seanad Éireann Deb (30 June 2011), vol 209, no 2, Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2011: Second 
Stage, at 149 online (pdf): <data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/debateRecord/seanad/2011-06-
30/debate/mul@/main.pdf>. 
58Natalie Low et al, Helping Out: A National Survey of Volunteering and Charitable Giving (London: National 
Centre for Social Research and the Institute for Volunteering Research for the Third Sector in the Cabinet 
Office, 2007) at 8, 52. 
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given in the UK Parliament,59 and also by a US House of Representatives committee report,60 
and in a detailed US study by Horwitz and Mead.61   
 
It is not the purpose of this section to establish that there is a compensation culture problem 
within the voluntary sector but rather to show that tort does play a role in the voluntary 
sector, that VSOs have expressed concerns as to liabilities in tort, and that responsible VSOs 
should consider their liability risks and how to mitigate them. This may also include 
judgment-proofing. 
IV. What is Judgment-Proofing? 
The collectability of damages is important in deciding whether or not to bring a claim in tort 
since judgments for damages against men of straw are of little value. Judgment-proofing is a 
deliberate technique designed to evade the payment of damages. It involves an entity holding 
insufficient wealth to meet claims or holding its wealth in a form safe from the enforcement 
of judgment debts. Thus, whether or not an entity is judgment-proof varies from claim to 
claim.62 µ+DUG¶MXGJPHQW-proofing is where claimants can only reach nominal assets. µSRIW¶ 
judgment-proofing is where claimants can reach substantial assets, but these are insufficient 
to meet the judgment.63 Depending on the form of judgment-proofing used, a form of 
organisational protection can be created which resembles an immunity, or a liability cap.  
 
The primary aim of judgment-proofing is to avoid paying tort damages rather than 
consensually-created liabilities. The reason is that liability in contract may be preserved 
through mechanisms such as personal (or third party) guarantees or security interests. Given 
the centrality of damages claims to the law of tort, it is surprising that judgment-proofing has 
received no attention in the tort law community other than from law and economics 
scholars.64 
V. Why Judgment-Proof? 
Judgment-proofing offers an organisation the opportunity to conduct activities whilst also 
avoiding litigation risks. The extent to which judgment-proofing is used is unclear, and some 
scholars doubt that it is ever viable or used.65 However, there is evidence of its use amongst 
                                                          
59UK, HC, Constitutional Affairs Committee, Compensation Culture (Third Report of Session 2005-06, 754-1) 
at 42-43, online (pdf): <publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmconst/754/754i.pdf>; UK, HC 
Deb (8 June 2006), col 469 (Julian Brazier); UK, HC Deb (8 June 2006), col 419 (Bridget Prentice). 
60US, Volunteer Liability Legislation, 105th Cong (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1997) 
at 10 (Hon Paul Coverdell).  
61Jill Horwitz & Joseph Mead, ³Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws and Tort 
Deterrence´ (2009) 6:3 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 585 at 614-15, 627. 
62Stephen Gilles, ³The Judgment-Proof Society´ (2006) 63 Washington & Lee Law Review 603 at 608.  
63Lynn LoPucki, ³The Death of Liability´ (1996) 106:1 Yale Law Journal 1 at 26, at n 107 >/R3XFNL³'HDWK´@. 
64See e.g. Steven Shavell, ³The Judgment Proof Problem´ (1986) 6 International Review of Law & Economics 
45; Kyle Logue, ³Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem´ (1994) 72 Texas Law Review 1375; Richard MacMinn, 
³On the Judgment-Proof Problem´ (2002) 27 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 143; Steven Shavell, 
³Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof 
Problem´ (2005) 36:1 RAND Journal of Economics 63; 7LP)ULHKH³$1RWHRQ-XGJPHQW3URRIQHVVDQG5LVN
$YHUVLRQ´(XURSHDQ-RXUQDORI/DZDQG(FRQRPLFV; Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn Spier, ³Strategic 
Judgment Proofing´ (2008) 39:4 RAND Journal of Economics 926; See ³The Case of the Disappearing 
Defendant: An Economic Analysis´ (1983) 132 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 145. 
65James White, ³&RUSRUDWH-XGJPHQW3URRILQJ$5HVSRQVHWR/\QQ/R3XFNL¶V7KH'HDWKRI/LDELOLW\´ (1998) 
107 Yale Law Journal 1363; Lynn LoPucki, ³Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder´ (1998) 107 Yale Law 
Journal 1413; Lynn LoPucki, ³The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing´ (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 
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professionals,66 and in high risk industries such as asbestos, 67 tobacco, 68 and shipping.69 
Nevertheless, despite this association with these sectors the potential attraction of judgment-
proofing to VSOs is clear. VSOs that may wish to judgment-proof are primarily those likely 
to face major claims; for instance, those involved in outward bound activities, contact sports, 
the provision of activities or care of children, those that work with vulnerable groups, and 
some medical organisations.  
 
Insurance is a mandatory requirement for participation in certain activities,70 and where the 
voluntary sector contracts with the state to deliver public services, the state can ensure that 
tort victims will receive compensation by requiring liability insurance.71 However, many 
activities which will be conducted by the voluntary sector, quite rightly, do not require 
mandatory insurance. Any additional requirement for compulsory insurance will limit these 
activities and potentially exclude communities and individuals of lesser means from 
participating in civil society, eroding the democratic role of the sector. 
 
Where a VSO is a charity, the trustees have a duty to protect its assets and resources, 
including from tort liabilities. Often this duty is discharged through purchasing insurance.72  
However, this is not the only way to discharge this duty. Judgment-proofing as an alternative, 
or used in combination with insurance, increases in attractiveness where insurance becomes 
unavailable or expensive. Whilst this assumes responsive premium setting, this has occurred 
in the context of FKDULWLHVZKLFKIDFLOLWDWHFKLOGUHQ¶VRXWGRRUDFWLYLWLHV73 There have also 
been problems in obtaining insurance when an organisation is dealing with a new social 
problem.74 This may force the claims of tort victims onto the assets of the organisation. Such 
depletion of assets may remove essential community services and discourage community 
activities. The threat of such claims may also discourage the making of large donations to a 
VSO if the donation will be potentially targeted by tort claimants. From the perspective of a 
VSO, there may be some value in structuring itself so as to protect itself and its assets in the 
case of withdrawal of insurance coverage, or a failure to obtain affordable insurance 
coverage, or from claims which exceed its insurance limit. For example, as noted above, 
institutional sexual abuse litigation has in some cases endangered the future of the 
organisation itself. Further, a VSO may wish to expand its activities to deal with emerging 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
147 [LoPucki, ³Essential Structure´@; Steven Schwarcz, ³The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing´ 
(1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 1; Steven Schwarcz, ³Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder´ (1999) 52 Stanford 
Law Review 77. 
66Che & Spier, supra note 64 at 927. 
67See Adams v Cape Industries Plc (1989), [1990] Ch 433 (CA (Eng)) [Adams]. See also Al Ringleb & Steven 
:LJJLQV³/LDELOLW\DQG/DUJH-Scale, Long-7HUP+D]DUGV´:3 Journal of Political Economy 574. 
686HH/R3XFNL³'HDWK´supra note 63 at 65-66, at nn 274-75. 
69The well-known practice of one ship companies used to evade sister ship arrest. 
70See e.g. Road Traffic Act 1988 (UK), s 143; (PSOR\HUV¶/LDELOLW\&RPSXOVRU\,QVXUDQFH$FW 1969 (UK). 
71
 In the light of Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust, [2002] EWCA Civ 1041 it is sensible for 
the public authority to require this; cf. Glaister v Appleby-in-Westmorland Town Council, [2009] EWCA Civ 
1325. 
72UK, Charity Commission for England and Wales, Charities and Insurance (CC49) (Charity Commission, 
2012) at para 1.1. 
73The Scout Association had its premium increased by 66% in 2004, leading to a curtailment of activities and 
the closure of some Scout troops who often have their own insurance. The charity Kids had its premium raised 
by 57%, and Trident Trust, a work placement charity for those aged 18-25, saw its premiums double. David 
Bamber, ³School trips and charities hit by soaring insurance costs´ (29 August 2004), online: The Telegraph 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1470462/School-trips-and-charities-hit-by-soaring-insurance-costs.html>.  
74Tremper, supra note 55 at 429-30. 
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problems whilst simultaneously protecting its existing operations and assets, particularly 
ZKHUHWKHQHZDUHDLVµKLJKULVN¶ 
VI. What Judgment-Proofing Mechanisms are Available to VSOs? 
Previous judgment-proofing literature concerns for-profits rather than VSOs, and there is no 
literature on judgment-proofing in an English law context. Given that judgment-proofing has 
primarily been discussed in a US context, we need to draw on this material.   
 
There are two viable techniques through which to judgment-proof a VSO and thus construct 
organisational protection: the use of charitable purpose trusts and the use of group 
structures.75 With both techniques there is a risk that the mechanisms will be challenged in 
the courts. However, as a matter of doctrinal law, both the use of charitable purpose trusts 
and group structures should provide significant protection from claims. 
VII. Charitable Purpose Trusts 
Perhaps due to the focus on for-profits, the US literature on judgment-proofing does not deal 
with the possibility of using charitable purpose trusts. Such mechanisms are highly suited to 
creating a judgment-proof structure for VSOs, although a VSO may only use such 
mechanisms where at least some of its purposes are exclusively charitable. Whilst not all 
VSOs are charities it may be possible to locate some charitable purposes in a number of 
VSOs which are not charities. 
 
:KHUHWKHWRUWRUWKHWUXVWHH¶VYLFDULRXVOLability for the tort of another, is connected with the 
administration of the trust, the trustee who acts properly has a right of indemnity, and the 
FODLPDQWLIQHHGEHPD\VWDQGLQWKHWUXVWHH¶VSODFHDQGHQIRUFHKLVFODLPGLUHFWO\DJDLQWKH
trust property through subrogation.76 It is trite law that where an individual trustee commits a 
tort which is not connected with the administration or purposes of the trust that the assets of 
the trust are not available to satisfy judgment against the trustee, and that trust assets are not 
available WRWKHWUXVWHH¶VFUHGLWRUVLQWKHFDVHRIWKHWUXVWHH¶VEDQNUXSWF\77   
 
Thus, if an impecunious teacher, who also happens to be a trustee of a charitable trust to 
provide housing for the homeless, is sued for negligently crashing his bicycle into a 
pedestrian whilst travelling to work as a teacher, the trust assets are entirely unconnected with 
the claim and the claimant cannot get their hands on them as there is no right of indemnity. If 
an individual is a trustee for two separate charitable purpose trusts ² the first a trust to 
SURYLGHDFFRPPRGDWLRQIRUWKHKRPHOHVVDQGWKHVHFRQGDFKLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQDORXWZDUG
bound trust ² the funds of the latter may be targeted by a claimant child who is negligently 
injured on a hike by a group leader employed by the trustee (by suing the trustee, who can 
obtain an indemnity from the trust), but the funds of the housing trust are unconnected with 
this, and may not be targeted.   
 
In both cases, it should make no difference if the trustee is instead a corporate trustee. Nor 
should it make any difference if the two separate charitable purpose trusts have similar 
                                                          
75Utilising secured debt and offshore trusts are unsuitable for VSOs struggling with insurance premiums. 
76Bennett v Wyndham, [1862] 45 ER 1183 (Ch (Eng)). 
77Re Pumfrey, (1882) 22 Ch D 255 (Ch (Eng)) (tKHFUHGLWRU¶VFODLPDJDLQVWWKHWUXVWIXQGVLV derivative, based on 
WKHWUXVWHH¶VRZQULJKWRILQGHPQLW\); Re Johnson, (1880) 15 Ch D 548 (Ch (Eng)) [Johnson] (if there is no right 
of indemnity, there is no claim); Ex parte Edmonds, [1862] 45 ER 1273 (Ch (Eng)).  
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purposes; for instance, LIERWKDUHHGXFDWLRQDOFKDULWDEOHSXUSRVHWUXVWV7KH962¶VDssets 
may thus be partitioned into separate charitable trusts to protect them from claims brought 
against the VSO. The removal of assets from the VSO to separate trusts may be used to 
judgment-proof the organisation. 
 
Donations to a non-profit or charity will generally go into the general funds of the 
organisation and will therefore become potentially available to tort creditors. This is so even 
LIWKHGRQRU¶VPRWLYHLVWREHQHILWDSDUWLFXODUFDXVH+RZHYHULWLVSRVVLEOHWRLPSUHVVWKH
donation with a trust where it is made for a certain purpose. In such a case, the non-profit is 
obliged to apply the donation to that purpose, and this binds third parties.78 This will depend 
on the circumstances in which the donation was solicited or made.79 Thus, for instance, when 
an educational VSO solicits donations to sponsor the education of a particular named child in 
a developing country, the funds may be impressed with a trust that the funds are to be applied 
to that purpose. However, where acquired assets pass into D962¶VJHQHUDOIXQGVUDWKHUWKDQ
to separate trusts, the VSO may subsequently create separate charitable trusts to shield these 
newly acquired assets and judgment-proof the organisation. 
 
Such mechanisms will not involve significant governance changes for many VSOs. For 
instance, whilst an incorporated charity holds its assets beneficially,80 and they are thus 
available to creditors,81 it is possible, and indeed common, for them to hold particular assets 
on trust, and it is standard accounting practice for charities to distinguish between income, 
endowment, and special trusts, which are separately accounted for.82 
 
The use of separate trusts means that if the parent organisation is swept away through 
litigation, the assets in the separate charitable purpose trust are still applied to the charitable 
purposes since the trust does not fail for the want of a trustee. However, tort creditors can still 
potentially access that asset where it is the activities of that trust that cause their injury. The 
method of asset partitioning used therefore protects assets from unrelated claims. However, 
when combined with a group structure (see below) it can also be used to protect the assets 
from related claims. Nevertheless, as we will see below, controversial litigation in Canada 
has permitted unrelated tort claims to access trust assets.   
 
In the case of an unincorporated association, judgment-proofing the trust funds may also be 
DWWHPSWHGE\UHPRYLQJDWUXVWHH¶VULJKWWRDQindemnity from the trust funds. Whilst an 
express attempt to do this is highly unlikely to be successful, since this right to an indemnity 
may not be excluded or restricted by the terms of the trust,83 and few trustees would agree to 
serve if this were the arrangement. Nevertheless, an attempt to remove the right of indemnity 
can be attempted via alternative means. This right to an indemnity can be removed by a 
deliberate trustee default in relation to the trust fund for sums that exceed likely claims.84 
This would, for instance, involve loans from the funds or deliberate breaches of fiduciary 
GXWLHV6XFKDGHOLEHUDWHDQGF\QLFDOIUDXGGHVLJQHGWRIUXVWUDWHDFUHGLWRU¶VRUIXWXUH
                                                          
78Twinsectra Limited v Yardley, [2002] UKHL 12 at para 76, Lord Millett. 
79Charity Commission for England and Wales v Framjee, [2014] EWHC 2507 (Ch) at para 38, Henderson J.  
80Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v AG, [1981] Ch 193 (Ch (Eng)). Note individuals 
holding charitable assets hold them on trust. 
81Re Wedgwood Museum Trust Limited (In Administration), [2011] EWHC 3782 (Ch) at 281 [Wedgwood]. 
82Alexander et al, supra note 28 at 156-58, 188-90.   
83Lynton Tucker, Nicholas Le Poidevin, & James Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts, 19d (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2015) at 834-54; Trustee Act 2000 (UK), s 31(1). 
84Note that in Johnson, supra note 77, the trustee was in default and was thus not entitled to an indemnity upon 
which the creditors could use to found their claim. 
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FUHGLWRU¶VHTXLWDEOHGHULYDWLYHFODLPXSRQWKHLQGHPQLW\LVOLNHO\WREHLJQRUHG by courts 
which are likely to permit the claim to continue. In addition, such a mechanism would expose 
trustees (many of whom will be volunteers) to personal liability, and in the case of charitable 
trusts, will additionally attract the attention of the Charity Commission for England and 
:DOHV³&KDULW\&RPPLVVLRQ´. Few trustees would agree to such a scheme.  Further, in 
addition to this derivative claim upon the indemnity, a tort victim may also have a direct 
claim against the trust funds in so far as there was unjust enrichment of the funds by the 
wrong.85 
 
Using a separate trust structure may not necessarily be a situation of deliberate judgment-
proofing. Legal policy recognises that some assets need to be protected from general 
creditors. Otherwise a defendant will never acquire them from a third party (such as a donor) 
in the first place.86 In fact, the acquisition of this asset or funds would represent a windfall to 
claimants, and objections to this form of asset protection must be limited.   
A. Challenges to Charitable Trust Judgment-Proofing 
To understand the level of protection provided to VSOs by judgment-proofing, we also need 
to examine potential challenges to it. Using more than one charitable purpose trust in order to 
insulate assets from potential claims is not risk-free. In Christian Brothers,87 which has faced 
judicial,88 academic,89 and legislative90 disapprobation, the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
allowed claimants to dip into a charitable purpose trust pot that was entirely unconnected 
with their claim and, in doing so, departed from traditional trust principles. 
 
In Christian Brothers, there were three relevant separate entities: (1) Vancouver College Ltd 
(³VCL´), a registered charity and a Catholic private school in Vancouver incorporated in 
1927; (2) St Thomas More Collegiate Ltd (³STMCL´), a registered charity and Catholic high 
school in British Columbia incorporated in 1962; and, finally, (3) the Christian Brothers of 
Ireland in Canada (³CBIC´), incorporated by Act of Parliament in 1962. 
 
CBIC operated schools and orphanages in Canada. Due to claims relating to abuse committed 
at an orphanage in Newfoundland, it was sought to wind up CBIC so that its assets would be 
available to compensate the claimants. The question was whether the assets of the two 
schools were also available in that winding up process to compensate the claimants. 
 
                                                          
85See e.g. Whiting v Hudson Trust Company, 234 NY 394 (NY Ct App 1923).  
86Examples include retention of title clauses and Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd, [1970] AC 
567 (HL (Eng)). 
87Supra note 41. 
88Rowland v Vancouver College Ltd, 2001 BCCA 527 at paras 179-83, Braidwood JA, dissenting (majority did 
not deal with the correctness of the Ontario decision). 
89.HYLQ'DYLV³9LFDULRXV/LDELOLW\-XGJPHQWProofing, and Non-PURILWV´8QLYHUVLW\RI7RURQWR/DZ
-RXUQDO7LPRWK\<RXGDQ³&UHGLWRU-Proofing Charities: What to do in Light of the Christian Brothers 
Decisions´ (2005) 42 Canadian Business Law Journal 198; Alison Dunn, ³Neither Fish nor Fowl?  The Use of 
Charitable Company Assets under English Law´ (2005) 42 Canadian Business Law Journal 223 [Dunn, 
³1HLWKHU)LVKQRU)RZO"´@Ogilvie, supra note 32; Jason Neyers & David Stevens, ³Vicarious Liability in the 
Charity Sector: An Examination of Bazley v Curry and Re Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada´ (2005) 42 
Canadian Business Law Journal 371; cf'DYLG:LQJILHOG³7KH1RQ-,PPXQLW\RI&KDULWDEOH7UXVW3URSHUW\´
(2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 44. 
90The British Columbia, Legislative Assembly following the Trustee Act Modernization Committee, Report on 
Creditor Access to the Assets of a Purpose Trust (BCLI Report No 24, 2003), legislated against the decision via 
the Charitable Purposes Preservation Act, SBC 2004, c 59. 
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The shares in VCL were held by four individual Christian Brothers in trust for the Christian 
Brothers of Ireland¶. The majority of the shares of STMCL were held by CBIC, with a 
minority being held by a lay teacher. 
 
For Justice Feldman, giving the leading judgment, the availability of the assets of the two 
schools followed from a rejection of the doctrine of charitable immunity. The entire 
corporation is vicariously liable, and all of its property is available to meet a claim, whether it 
holds it beneficially or holds it on trust.91 It was therefore unnecessary to examine whether an 
DVVHWLVEHQHILFLDOO\RZQHGRUµWUXVWIXQGV¶ Justice Feldman considered that there is no need 
for the claim to relate to particular assets of a corporation for those assets to be made 
available to meet judgments.92 Where a charitable corporation has more than one charitable 
purpose, all assets, and not just those connected with that purpose, are available to meet 
claims.93 According to Justice Feldman, it would be contrary to the policy which underlay the 
rejection of charitable immunity to allow special charitable purpose trusts to be used to 
segregate assets in order to defeat tort claimants.94 Justice Doherty, whilst concurring, was 
more reticent, dealing only with the winding up of a charitable corporation ² a final 
accounting, which looks at the corporation as a ³single whole entity´.95 
 
The decision means that a charitable purpose trust can be wound up for the liability of the 
trustee, which is unconnected with the administration or activities of the trust.96 However, a 
narrower reading can be given that it applies only in the case where the trustee is a charitable 
corporation. Nevertheless, the decision departed from traditional trust principles and is a 
³radical break with precedent´.97 However, the critics of the decision fail to distinguish 
between the two schools such that the decision may be defensible as far as VCL is concerned, 
in that it was beneficially owned by CBIC, but not STMCL. Neyers and Stevens consider that 
it abolishes the charitable purpose trust, although it could be confined to apply only where a 
charitable corporation is the trustee. Further, they state:  
 
[t]he court speaks of claims against CBIC, as if the corporate patrimony were 
the only patrimony on the scene. The court largely ignores, or misunderstands, 
the possibility that CBIC both owned property beneficially and that it was the 
trustee of two charitable purpose trusts.98 
 
A rejection of charitable immunity does not lead to such an outcome. That charitable 
immunity from tort is not the law in Canada ² or England ² is not controversial. It follows 
from the decision in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees v Gibbs99 that charitable 
trust assets are potentially available to tort claimants. However, this decision does not deal 
with the question of whether both sets of assets are available when an individual or charitable 
corporation holds its own assets, and also holds assets as a trustee as part of a separate 
charitable purpose trust. That the former assets are available to meet a judgment is 
                                                          
91Christian Brothers, supra note 41 at 82. 
92Ibid at 83. 
93Ibid at 84. 
94Ibid at 28, 82-85. 
95Ibid at 106. 
96Ogilvie, supra note 32 at 191. 
97Davis, supra note 89 at 408, 429. 
98Neyers & Stevens, supra note 89 at 412, 371-81. 
99(1866) 11 ER 1500 (HL (Eng)). 
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uncontroversial, but to make the latter assets available is to ignore the existence of the 
separate trust, and to ignore general principles of the law of trusts.100   
 
Where there are two trusts, the trusts may be wholly unrelated and the only thing they may 
have in common is the identity of a trustee. The fact that a corporate trustee is being wound 
up should not change matters since ³the continued existence of a charitable trust does not 
depend on the continued existence of the trustee. The trust would continue and, if necessary, 
the court would appoint a new trustee´.101 
 
Christian Brothers does not represent the position in England. In English trust law, it is not 
generally possible to lift the veil of a trust so as to make trust assets available to meet the 
liabilities of the settlor unless the trust is a sham.102 Thus, the use of separate charitable 
purpose trusts to protect assets is still possible.   
 
Nevertheless, even if the English courts were to follow the Ontario courts in Christian 
Brothers, it is still possible to plan around the decision through the use of separate 
corporations103 or with charitable purpose trusts where the trustees are not a charitable 
corporation.104 In addition, in Christian Brothers, the risk generating entity held the shares of 
the asset holding entities. An alternative structure could avoid this. If the claims had arisen 
from one of the two schools, apart from the assets of the school in question it is difficult to 
see how CBIC and its assets could have been targeted,. The problem with the structuring as 
used in CBIC is that the liability generating organisation owned one of the asset holding 
organisations and not the other way around. Separate charitable purpose trusts therefore still 
provide a viable mechanism for judgment-proofing if structured properly. 
 
Whilst such mechanisms may not be suitable for smaller VSOs, despite potential challenges 
to judgment-proofing structures based on separate charitable purpose trusts they remain 
viable options for larger concerns.  Nevertheless, as the litigation in Christian Brothers 
shows, the use of such structures may still embroil the organisation in complex litigation, and 
judges may be tempted to re-write the law of trusts where faced with the victims of egregious 
torts and assets protected through the use of separate trusts.  Further, not all VSOs have 
charitable purposes. Therefore, using charitable trusts is not available as a judgment-proofing 
strategy for all VSOs. 
VIII. Group Structure Judgment-Proofing 
Group structure judgment-proofing is potentially available to protect all types of VSOs, not 
just those with charitable purposes. It involves a relationship between more than one 
incorporated entity within a group structure: one (X) which holds most of the assets and a 
second (Y) which generates risks but holds little, if any, assets.105 Y is owned by X. This 
V\VWHPSURWHFWVWKHDVVHWVRI;IURP<¶VMXGJPHQWFUHGLWRUVVLQFHRQO\<¶VDVVHWVDUHH[SRVHG
to claims. 
 
                                                          
100Davis, supra note 89 at 436, 441. 
101Youdan, supra note 89 at 205. 
102R v Vickers, [2010] EWCA Crim 3246 at para 7, Moses LJ; Larkfield Limited v Revenue and Customs 
Prosecutions Office, Barnes, and May, [2010] EWCA Civ 521. 
103Dunn, ³Neither Fish nor Fowl?´supra note 89 at 242. 
104Youdan, supra note 89 at 207-11. 
105LoPucki, ³Essential Structure´supra note 65 at 149. 
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Incorporation is available to VSOs, which results in separate legal identity and limited 
liability.106 Limited liability means that claims against the company may only be executed 
DJDLQVWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDVVHWVQRW the assets of shareholders.107 It also has the advantage of 
protecting organisational assets from claims brought against the members or volunteers in a 
personal capacity.108   
 
An enterprise may be subdivided into different companies: parent, subsidiary, and sub-
subsidiary companies. A subsidiary is a separate legal entity from its parent even if they are 
managed in a coordinated fashion.109 This results in asset and liability partitioning. Limited 
liability also operates within a group of companies.110 A group structure itself does not render 
the risk-generating subsidiary company judgment-proof; it merely defeats liabilities which 
exceed the value of the company assets.111 To create a judgment-proof entity, the risk 
generating entity needs to be stripped of assets. Within the for-profit sector, any revenues 
which are generated by the subsidiary are regularly removed. With a VSO structured into an 
asset holding parent company and a risk-generating subsidiary company which generates 
revenue ² for instance, by charging for its services ² it is also possible to strip the 
subsidiary of its revenues albeit by different means to the for-profit sector. For instance, an 
incorporated charity might own a limited company that regularly makes donations to its 
SDUHQW¶VFKDULWDEOHpurposes. Where the subsidiary does not generate revenue, since it 
delivers its services for free, the structure may operate without any need to strip the 
subsidiary of revenue.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that this method of judgment-proofing is used by some Canadian 
charities.112 Guidance on risk management in charities produced by the Charity Commission 
also envisages the passing on of risk to a third party, such as a trading subsidiary.113 
A. Challenges to Group Structure Judgment-Proofing 
Group structure judgment-proofing is potentially vulnerable to a number of challenges.  
Firstly, veil-piercing, which disregards the separate legal identities and looks through the 
company to its shareholders. Nevertheless, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom make it clear that it will be rare,114 and it is unlikely that veil-piercing would be 
available in the case of a judgment-proof VSO.115 In Adams,116 the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales ruled that a court is not entitled to pierce the veil, even where the 
corporate structure has been deliberately created to protect the parent from future liability in 
tort, by ensuring that such risks fall on a subsidiary. The ability to construct such a structure 
                                                          
106See also UK, Charity Commission for England and Wales, Charity Types: How to Choose a Structure 
(CC22a) (Charity Commission, 2014). 
107See Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), s 74(2)(d) [Insolvency Act].   
108+HQU\+DQVPDQQ	5HLQLHU.UDDNPDQ³7KH(VVHQWLDO5ROHRI2UJDQL]DWLRQDO/DZ´<DOH/DZ
Journal 387 at 394. 
109Adams, supra note 67 at 536, Slade LJ. 
110Re Southard & Co Ltd, [1979] 1 WLR 1198 (CA (Eng)) at 1208, Templeman LJ. 
111LoPucki, ³Death´supra note 63 at 21. 
112Mark Anshan, ³Credit Proofing Charity Assets´ (30 April 2014), online: Drache Aptowitzer LLP 
<drache.ca/articles/charities-article-archive/credit-proofing-charity-assets/>. 
113UK, Charity Commission for England and Wales, Charities and Risk Management (CC26), (Charity 
Commission, 2010) at 17. 
114Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd, [2013] UKSC 34 [Prest]; VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp, 
[2013] UKSC 5 [VTB]. 
115See VTB, ibid at para 143, Lord Neuberger. 
116Supra note 67. 
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was considered to be an inherent right, whether or not it was socially desirable to do so.117 
Given the reliance by the Supreme Court in Prest118 on Adams, the decision undoubtedly 
remains good law. 
 
Secondly, direct duties may be used to challenge the structure where an attempt is made to 
establish a direct duty of care between the claimant and the parent company, bypassing the 
subsidiary. Such claims are distinct from veil-piercing, but are extremely rare119 and offer 
little relief from a judgment-proof structure. 
 
Thirdly, an attempt might be made to establish dual vicarious liability120 of an asset-holding 
parent company (i.e. to establish that the parent company as well as the subsidiary company 
is vicariousO\OLDEOHIRUWKHVXEVLGLDU\FRPSDQ\¶VHPSOR\HHYROXQWHHU). However, careful 
corporate structuring and policies will prevent such a claim from being successful, 
SDUWLFXODUO\LIWKHSDUHQWFRPSDQ\GLVWDQFHVLWVHOIIURPWKHVXEVLGLDU\¶VRSHUDWLRQVDQGGRHV
nRWLQYROYHLWVHOIZLWKWKHVXEVLGLDU\¶VHPSOR\HHVRUYROXQWHHUV7KDWDSDUHQWFRPSDQ\PD\
EHYLFDULRXVO\OLDEOHIRUDVXEVLGLDU\FRPSDQ\¶VWRUWV121 does not, at this stage of English 
legal development, offer relief to a claimant.122 Nevertheless, there may be pressure to 
develop such claims, given the new highly restrictive approach to veil-piercing where 
judgment-proofing via a group structure is used to evade liability for egregious torts such as 
institutionalised sexual abuse, which may occur in VSOs associated with the provision of 
activities for children. Finally, where the subsidiary has dissipated wealth, this judgment-
proofing strategy may also be disrupted through attempts to reverse the transactions through 
which the subsidiary has dissipated its wealth.123   
 
Despite these potential challenges, a group structure still offers a viable mechanism for 
judgment-proofing VSOs. However, its viability is limited to more sophisticated entities and 
it is not appropriate for smaller community based VSOs. Furthermore, this strategy of 
judgment-proofing potentially exposes the directors of the undercapitalised company to 
personal liability.124 This is shifting the risk from the entity to its officers and directors ² 
who may be unpaid volunteers.   
 
                                                          
117Ibid at 544. 
118Supra note 114 at paras 21-22, Lord Sumption. 
119Lubbe v Cape Plc, [2000] UKHL 41; Connelly v RTZ Corp Plc, [1999] CLC 533 (QB (Eng)) (strike out, duty 
of care was arguable); Ngcobo v Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd, [1995] EWCA Civ J1009-1; Vedanta Resources 
Plc v Lungowe, [2019] UKSC 20 (jurisdictional challenge, duty of care was arguable). Whilst successful in 
Chandler v Cape Plc, [2012] EWCA Civ 525, it is easily evaded. Thompson v The Renwick Group Plc, [2014] 
EWCA Civ 635 demonstrates that a duty will not be imposed where the parent company acts as a holding 
company. See also Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell Plc, [2018] EWCA Civ 191; AAA v Unilever Plc, [2018] EWCA 
Civ 1532. 
120See Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd, [2005] EWCA Civ 1151; Various 
Claimants, supra note 42. 
121Phillip Morgan, ³Vicarious Liability for Group Companies: The Final Frontier of Vicarious Liability?´ 
(2015) 31 Journal of Professional Negligence 276; Martin Petrin, ³Assumption of Responsibility in Corporate 
Groups: Chandler v Cape Plc´ (2013) 76:3 Modern Law Review 603. 
122See generally William Rands, ³Domination of a Subsidiary by a Parent´ (1999) 32 Indiana Law Review 421 
at 443-46 (such claims have been allowed in the US, but these are mostly veil-piercing cases rather than true 
vicarious liability cases).  
123Insolvency Act, supra note 107, ss 238, 423; See -RKQ$UPRXU³7UDQVDFWLRQVDWDQ8QGHUYDOXH´LQ-RKQ
Armour & Howard Bennett, eds, Vulnerable Transactions in Corporate Insolvency (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2003) at 37, 97. 
124See Insolvency Act, ibid, ss 212, 214.   
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IX. Voluntary Sector Specific Concerns Towards Judgment-Proofing 
Now that we have established that judgment-proofing is available to VSOs, and that it may 
offer significant protection to the voluntary sector from liabilities in tort, we must now 
address voluntary sector specific concerns towards judgment-proofing. Given that so far the 
discussion of judgment-proofing within the literature concerns for-profits, these voluntary 
sector issues have not yet been discussed.   
A. Voluntary Sector Reputation 
Being seen to utilise clever structuring to avoid paying for the consequences of liability may 
have reputational consequences for a VSO. 
 
0DLQWDLQLQJDKLJKUHSXWDWLRQLVLPSRUWDQWWRD962¶V and WKHEURDGHUYROXQWDU\VHFWRU¶V
DELOLW\WRGLVFKDUJHDQXPEHURIWKHVHFWRU¶VUROHVSDUWLFXODUO\WKHVHFWRU¶VDELOLW\WRVSHDN
truth to power, and in providing public goods. Judgment-proofing creates a reputational risk 
for VSOs since a deliberate strategy of judgment-proofing deprives tort victims of their 
remedies, requiring them to fall back on their own resources, the welfare state, and charity. It 
is also possible that the use of judgment-proofing may imperil the high reputation that the 
voluntary sector itself enjoys. 
 
Industries in which judgment-proofing has been used, such as the asbestos and tobacco 
industry, may have little concern about their public image when compared with the voluntary 
sector. Nevertheless, even within such industries, attempts to judgment-proof may also face 
other external pressures such as governmental and union pressure, public inquiries, as well as 
negative publicity, which ultimately forces the asset holding entity to provide more capital to 
meet compensation claims, as has been experienced with asbestos manufacturing in 
Australia.125 Where there is widespread use of judgment-proofing the legislature may 
intervene; for instance, as with environmental legislation in the US in response to widespread 
use of poorly capitalised subsidiaries in the waste disposal industry126 or in the UK with 
pension liabilities.127 
 
With the voluntary sector, the public relations consequences of judgment-proofing may be 
more pronounced than for-profits. Where a VSO relies on government funding or contracts, 
its use of judgment-proofing may lead to the loss of opportunities if the entity develops a 
reputation for irresponsible risk-taking. It may also lead to greater regulation of the sector. 
This is particularly so if tort claimants attempt to target the state or local authority directly, in 
an attempt to bypass a judgment-proof VSO. A poor reputation may also lead to a decline in 
donations and volunteers and the loss of influence at the local and national policy making 
level.128 High levels of public trust and confidence are required if the sector is to effectively 
speak truth to power. 
 
 
 
                                                          
125Peter Cane & James Goudkamp, $WL\DK¶VAccidents, Compensation and the Law, 9d (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018) at 217. 
126See e.g. The US Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 USC § 9601 
et seq (1980). 
127See e.g. Pensions Act 1995 (UK), c 26, s 75 [Pensions Act].   
128See Lytton, supra note 42. 
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B. Public Relations Examples 
The reported English cases on clerical sexual abuse, so far, reveal no attempt to have been 
made by the Roman Catholic Church in England to rely on judgment-proofing, despite the 
fact that due to an accident of history, the Church is structurally judgment-proof in England. 
The litigation, so far, has instead primarily been contested on the scope of vicarious 
liability.129  
 
Whilst a Diocesan Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church may be vicariously liable for a 
Diocesan Priest,130 on the basis that they are in a relationship ³akin to employment´,131 the 
Bishop is not a corporation sole in English law, unlike in the Anglican Church. There is thus 
no legal continuity as a matter of civil law between successors in the office.   
 
Essentially, this means that a Bishop appointed in the 2010s is being held liable for the ³akin 
to employment´132 relationship that was exercised by his (often now dead) predecessor over a 
priest of the diocese in the 1970s, a time when the Bishop might not even have been ordained 
as a priest. As a matter of law, this simply cannot be correct. Further, the Bishop is being 
sued in a personal capacity ² in his own name. His own assets and estate are being exposed. 
:KLOVWWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDQGLWVLQVXUHUVDUHFXUUHQWO\EDFNLQJµWKHLUPDQ¶KHGRHVQRWRZQWKH
assets of the Diocese. The assets will be held in various charitable trusts, which may be 
incorporated, and/or held by various trustees. Again, the identity of the trustees may be 
different to those at the time of the alleged abuse.133   
 
The institution of a Roman Catholic Diocese is a creature of Roman Catholic Canon law, 
which is not recognised by English common law. It therefore exists at law, if at all, as an 
unincorporated association. For there to be an unincorporated association there is a need for a 
contract between each and every member.134 Whilst such contracts are easily found,135 the 
characterisation of a Diocese as an unincorporated association may be disputed since an 
unincorporated association requires a contract between members, and the desire for the 
relationship between members to be governed by Roman Catholic Canon law may mean that 
there is no intention to create legal relations as a matter of the English law of contract. 
 
That reliance on such a defence, which is perfectly valid as a matter of law, may be a public 
relations disaster  is demonstrated by the experience in New South Wales. In Trustees of the 
Roman Catholic Church v Ellis,136 a claim brought against Cardinal Pell, Archbishop of 
Sydney, was struck out. The claims related to abuse committed by a priest between 1974 and 
1979.  Cardinal Pell had no relevant connection with the Sydney Archdiocese prior to 2001. 
Further, the claims brought against the Diocesan trustees in Ellis were also unsuccessful, 
                                                          
129See e.g. Maga v Archbishop of Birmingham, [2010] EWCA Civ 256; JGE, supra note 42. 
130JGE, ibid. 
131Ibid at para 18. 
132Ibid. 
133There are allegations that the changing identity of trustees has been utilised as a litigation device at the issuing 
stage, see generally Justin Levinson³Tactics in Child Abuse Claims against the Catholic Church´, Personal 
Injury Focus, 1 Crown Office Row (September 2006) online: 
<www.preview2.1cor.enstar.net/1158/section.nc?startpointt1164i23=50&form_1105.replyids=wmocztgus&start
pointt1159i19=280>. 
134Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell, [1982] 1 WLR 522 (CA (Eng)) at 525. 
135Nicholas Stewart, Natalie Campbell & Simon Baughan, The Law of Unincorporated Associations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 12. 
136[2007] NSWCA 117 (Austl) [Ellis], permission to appeal to the HCA refused, [2007] HCATrans 697. 
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since they were property holders only, and were well-removed from the management, 
appointment, or oversight of priests.137 
 
As a matter of law, the defence was conducted entirely properly. However, the decision in 
Ellis has gained notoriety and much negative media publicity for the Roman Catholic Church 
both in Australia and internationally. The Archdiocese of Sydney had to issue a public 
declaration that it ³has not organised its affairs to avoid its responsibilities to victims´ and 
that it subsequently provided Mr. Ellis with financial assistance.138    
 
There is increasing pressure at both the Governmental and Parliamentary level in Australia 
for reform. A Parliament of Victoria inquiry was highly critical of the position taken by the 
5RPDQ&DWKROLF&KXUFKUHMHFWLQJ&DUGLQDO3HOO¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDWWKH&KXUFKKDGQRWUHOLHGRQ
DµOHJDOWHFKQLFDOLW\¶DQGGHFODULQJWKDWWKHUHZDVWHQVLRQEHWZHHQDFRPPLWPHQWWRMXVWLFH
and such defences, and that government intervention was necessary. The Committee 
recommended that nominal defendants be used in such cases.139 In May 2014, the 
Government of Victoria accepted this recommendation in principle.140   
 
Cardinal Pell also faced critical cross examination in relation to the Ellis case before 
$XVWUDOLD¶V5R\DO&RPPLVVLRQLQWR,QVWLWXWLRQDO5HVSRQVHVWR&KLOG$EXVH141 where the 
$UFKGLRFHVH¶VLQWHUQDOOLWLJDWLRQFRUUHVSRQGHQFHZDVpublicly exposed. Cardinal Pell felt it 
necessary to make a public apology for his handling of the case.142 The Royal Commission, 
in its final report, recommended that legislation should be introduced at state level so that 
where sexual abuse litigation concerns an institution:  
 
with which a property trust is associated, then unless the institution nominates 
a proper defendant to sue that has sufficient assets to meet any liability arising 
from the proceedings: a. the property trust is a proper defendant to the 
litigation, b. any liability of the institution with which the property trust is 
associated that arises from the proceedings can be met from the assets of the 
trust.143  
                                                          
137See generally Doe, supra note 42 at para 12 (related, but unsuccessful, arguments have been run in Canada, 
although this was in the context of a statutorily created corporation sole).  
138Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney, ³The Ellis Decision ² a Re-VWDWHPHQWRIWKH/DZ´ (14 September 2015), 
online: Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney <www.sydneycatholic.org/justice/royalcommission/ellis.asp> in Key 
Facts. 
139Austl, Commonwealth, Betrayal of Trust, Inquiry in the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other 
Non-Government Organisations, Parl Paper No 275 (2013) at 511-12. 
140*RYHUQPHQWRI9LFWRULD³Victorian Government Response to the report of the Family and Community 
Development Committee Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and other Non-Governmental 
Organisations µBetrayal of Trust¶´, online (pdf): Government of Victoria 
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_Response_to_the_FCDC_Inquiry_into_the_Handling_of_Child_Abuse_by_Religious_and_Other_Non-
Government_Organisations.pdf>. 
141See Austl, Royal Commission into Institution Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Consultation Paper: Redress 
and Civil Litigation (Royal Commission, 2015) at 229-30. 
142Catherine Armitage, ³George Pell apologises to John Elllis [sic]EXWFDQ¶WORRNDWKLP´ (27 March 2014), 
online: The Sydney Morning Herald <www.smh.com.au/nsw/george-pell-apologises-to-john-elllis-but-cant-
look-at-him-20140327-35lo9.html>. See generally %%&³George Pell: Cardinal found guilty of sexual offences 
in Australia´ (26 February 2019), online: BBC <bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-47366113> (Cardinal Pell has 
now himself been convicted of sex offences).  
143Austl, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Final Report 
Recommendations (Royal Commission 2017) at Recommendation 94; Austl, Royal Commission into 
21 
 
 
Victoria and New South Wales have now implemented this recommendation via the Legal 
Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018144 and the Civil Liability 
Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse Liability) Act 2018,145 respectively. Western 
Australia has dealt with Ellis via the Civil Liability Legislation Amendment (Child Sexual 
Abuse Actions) Act 2018.146 Other jurisdictions appear to be following suit. 
 
The lesson to be learned from Ellis is that reliance on judgment-proofing defences by a VSO 
may lead to highly damaging publicity. It may also lead to legislative attempts to close the 
door upon the use of such structures. 
 
Nevertheless, care must be taken with this case study. The claim in tort related to institutional 
child abuse, and this is very different to ordinary negligence. The values of Christianity and 
the Roman Catholic Church, and the expected conduct of its adherents, may also have 
influenced the public perception of the way in which the litigation was conducted. A secular 
organisation, such as the Scouts, may be perceived in a different light. Further, even when the 
Roman Catholic Church has defended such claims on other grounds ² for instance, on points 
relating to the scope of vicarious liability ² it has still faced negative publicity for its 
actions. Because of the size and scope of the voluntary sector, there is a plurality in the nature 
of the services that are offered, the species of tort, and the conduct underlying the tort. This 
makes the issue of public relations and public perception complex. A person who strains their 
wrist whilst spinning a tombola drum at a village fete is in a very different class to the victims 
of systematic institutional abuse of minors. 
 
In other cases, the use of judgment-proofing mechanisms to attempt to defend assets from 
claims has generated public support. Whilst not a tort case, an attempt was made to protect 
the Wedgwood collection and museum from claims relating to group pension liabilities.147 In 
this case, the failed attempt to assert the existence of a structure (separate incorporation) 
designed to protect assets against claims generated considerable public support and inspired a 
successful public campaign, resulting in The Heritage Lottery Fund, The Art Fund, as well as 
RWKHUWUXVWVVDYLQJWKHPXVHXP¶VFROOHFWLRQIRUWKHQDWLRQ148 Further with the Christian 
Brothers litigation the attempt to defend the assets of the schools in British Columbia was 
politically popular, particularly since the abuse occurred in a province thousands of miles 
away, and was entirely unconnected with the schools.149 Indeed, after the decision was 
handed down by the Court of Appeal of Ontario, the Legislative Assembly of British 
Columbia expressly legislated against the decision.150 These examples demonstrate that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Redress and Civil Litigation Report (Royal Commission 2015) 
at 496-509. 
144(Vic), 2018/18. 
145(NSW), 2018/56.  
146(WA), 2018/13. 
147See Wedgwood, supra note 81. Pensions Act, supra note 127, s 75 bypassed the mechanism of separate 
incorporation, which was used to protect the Wedgwood collection and museum from potential adverse trading 
conditions. The museum, as last man standing, had to foot the bill of the entire WedgwooG*URXS¶VSHQVLRQ
deficit.  
148%%&³:HGJZRRGFROOHFWLRQµVDYHGIRUQDWLRQ¶´2FWREHURQOLQHBBC <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-stoke-staffordshire-29460282>. 
1493DXO6FKUDW]³/RQJ$JR)DU$ZD\$EXVH0D\&ORVH&DQDGLDQ6FKRROV´-XO\RQOLne: National 
Catholic Register <www.ncregister.com/site/article/long_ago_far_away_abuse_may_close_canadian_schools/>. 
150Charitable Purposes Preservation Act, SBC 2004, c 59. This Act, whilst retrospective, did not affect the 
settlement with the liquidator in relation to the schools per subsection 6(2).  
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whilst the use of judgment-proofing structures has the potential to damage the reputation of 
the sector, not all such uses will necessarily do so. 
C. Reduced Volunteering? 
Volunteers are the life-blood of the voluntary sector. If a judgment-proof VSO cannot be 
viably sued for its wrongs or the wrongs of its µDJHQWV¶WKHQLIYLFWLPVDUHQRWWRJR
uncompensated, claims, which might otherwise have been brought against the VSO, may 
instead be brought against its volunteers.   
 
Whilst many volunteers will not have sufficient assets or insurance to meet a non-driving-
related tort claim, and even where they do, it may be more difficult to sue them when 
compared to organisations151 volunteers may place their own assets at risk when they 
volunteer for judgment-proof VSOs. Judgment-proofing would also protect VSOs against 
WKHLURZQYROXQWHHUV¶FODLPVZKHUHWKH\DUHLQMXUHGWKURXJKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VQHJOLJHQFe. 
 
Whilst claims against volunteers may be rare, particularly where they are uninsured, English 
law does not prevent such claims, and VSO judgment-proofing encourages it. We have seen 
above that there is evidence that tort law deters volunteering. Judgment-proofing increases 
WRUW¶VGHWHUUHQWHIIHFWRQYROXQWHHUVDQGLQFUHDVHVWKHFRVWRIYROXQWHHULQJ7KLVPD\ over-
deter volunteers152 and lead to a reduction in volunteering or a diversion of volunteer efforts 
away from judgment-proof VSOs towards VSOs which are not judgment-proof. Whilst 
volunteers may be able to spread this cost through personal insurance policies, these 
premiums still represent an increase in volunteering costs and formality, which points 
towards reduced volunteering. 
 
VSOs with a reputation for judgment-proofing may lose volunteers, a relevant factor in 
deciding whether or not to adopt judgment-proofing. However, since many volunteers will 
not be aware of the insurance and judgment-proofing status of the VSO for which they 
volunteer, there is a risk that high profile incidents of judgment-proofing resulting in 
individual volunteers being sued in a personal capacity, may damage the reputation of the 
whole sector, and impact volunteering levels across the sector. 
X. Conclusion 
Whilst some scholars have doubted the existence of judgment-proofing, this article 
demonstrates that judgment-proofing is a real phenomenon, particularly in high risk 
industries. Judgment-proofing may also be tempting to VSOs concerned with insurance costs, 
or protecting assets from large claims, or branching out into new and potentially hazardous 
areas of services. It is possible to create a judgment-proof structure within the voluntary 
sector by using charitable trusts and/or corporate group structuring. Such devices are used to 
generate a structure whereby the risk-generating elements of a VSO hold insufficient assets to 
meet claims. The VSO makes itself a man of straw whilst continuing to have access to and 
use of the assets, allowing it to have its cake and eat it. 
 
                                                          
151See Robert Heidt, ³The Unappreciated Importance, For Small Business Defendants, Of The Duty To Settle´ 
(2010) 62 Maine Law Review 75 at 92; Tom Baker, ³Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of 
Tort Law in Action´ (2001) 35:2 Law & Society Review 275.   
152Gilles, supra note 62 at 682. 
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Although using judgment-proofing is not fool-proof, and may face legal challenges, it may 
provide significant asset protection and discourage claims, allowing the organisation to 
externalise its accident costs. This will leave the loss to fall on victims or individual 
volunteers. Nevertheless, the widespread use of judgment-proofing mechanisms by VSOs 
may create pressure on legislatures and the courts to generate new legal solutions to get 
around such structures in egregious cases; for instance, by expanding direct duties of care, 
expanding the law of vicarious liability, re-writing the law of trusts (as in Ontario), or the 
creation of special legislative mechanisms (as in Australia). 
 
There are also a number of sector-specific concerns in relation to judgment-proofing. The use 
of judgment-proofing to evade paying for liabilities can generate reputational concerns for 
VSOs. Whilst the use of such mechanisms is not universally condemned, the use of such 
structures to evade paying for tort liabilities has generated negative commentary in some 
cases. Such structures may threaten the reputation of the sector, which, as well as impacting 
on donations and volunteering levels, may impact the public role and prominence of the 
sector, and its ability tRVSHDNWUXWKWRSRZHU3XEOLFGLVFRXUVHLVHQULFKHGE\WKHVHFWRU¶V
DELOLW\WRGUDZXSRQLWVXQLTXHNQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHULHQFH0DLQWDLQLQJWKHVHFWRU¶V
reputation is important in facilitating its ability to meet demands for public goods and its 
ability to contribute towards government accountability. 
Whilst VSOs may construct organisational protection from tort through judgment-proofing 
mechanisms, it comes at a cost both for the VSO itself (above and beyond the costs of 
constructing and administering the judgment-proofing scheme), and for the sector as a whole. 
 
